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透過 Workload Identity、Secret Manager、RBAC、二進位授權、網路政策及 Pod 安全標準,強化 Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) 叢集的安全性。

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更新時間 2026-09-03

GKE 安全性

本參考指南涵蓋 GKE 叢集的安全性設定。黃金路徑 預設會強制實施強化安全措施。

MCP 工具: get_clustercheck_k8s_authget_k8s_resourceapply_k8s_manifestupdate_cluster

黃金路徑的安全預設值

設定 黃金路徑值 第 0/1 天 備註
workloadIdentityConfig.workloadPool .svc.id.goog 第 0 天 Pod 的工作負載身分聯邦
secretManagerConfig.enabled true 第 1 天 Google Secret Manager 整合
secretManagerConfig.rotationConfig 啟用:true,輪替間隔:120 秒 第 1 天 自動機密輪替
rbacBindingConfig.enableInsecureBindingSystemAuthenticated false 第 0 天 封鎖舊版「系統已驗證」綁定
rbacBindingConfig.enableInsecureBindingSystemUnauthenticated false Day-0 封鎖舊版系統:未經認證的綁定
nodeConfig.shieldedInstanceConfig.enableSecureBoot true 第 0 天 可驗證的開機完整性
nodeConfig.shieldedInstanceConfig.enableIntegrityMonitoring true 第 0 天 執行階段完整性檢查
nodeConfig.workloadMetadataConfig.mode GKE_METADATA 第 0 天 封鎖舊版元資料 API,強制執行工作負載身分識別
私有叢集 + 資料平面 V2 設定 請參閱gke-networking技能 Day-0 私有節點、私有端點強制執行、ADVANCED_DATAPATH

工作負載身分聯邦

「工作負載身分識別」是 Pod 存取 Google Cloud API 的建議方式。 此方法可免除使用靜態服務帳戶金鑰的必要。

設定

# 1. 建立 Google 服務帳戶 (GSA)
gcloud iam service-accounts create \
  --project \
  --display-name "Workload Identity SA" \
  --quiet

# 2. 授予 GSA IAM 角色
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding \
  --member "serviceAccount:@.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "" \
  --quiet

# 3. 建立 Kubernetes 服務帳戶 (KSA)
kubectl create namespace
kubectl create serviceaccount --namespace

# 4. 將 KSA 綁定至 GSA
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
  @.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
  --role roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser \
  --member "serviceAccount:.svc.id.goog[/]" \
  --quiet

# 5. 為 KSA 添加註解
kubectl annotate serviceaccount \
  --namespace \
  iam.gke.io/gcp-service-account=@.iam.gserviceaccount.com

請參閱 assets/workload-identity-pod.yaml 以取得測試 Pod。

驗證

kubectl run workload-identity-test \
  --image=gcr.io/google.com/cloudsdktool/cloud-sdk:slim \
  --serviceaccount= --namespace= \
  --rm -it -- gcloud auth list --quiet

Secret Manager 整合

此黃金路徑可啟用具備自動輪替功能的 Secret Manager。機密會 同步至 Kubernetes Secrets。

# 驗證叢集中是否已啟用 Secret Manager
gcloud container clusters describe --region \
  --format="value(secretManagerConfig.enabled)" \
  --quiet

# 若尚未啟用,請啟用(Day-1 變更)
gcloud container clusters update --region \
  --enable-secret-manager \
  --secret-manager-rotation-interval=120s \
  --quiet

透過 CSI 卷掛載機密(部署範例)

啟用 Secret Manager 附加元件後,工作負載即可透過 Secrets Store CSI 驅動程式, 將機密掛載為卷。此操作需執行以下兩個步驟:

  1. 定義SecretProviderClass以指定要從 Secret Manager 擷取哪些祕密。
  2. 引用該類別的 Deployment中掛載該卷

[!重要]生產環境最佳實務:始終使用符合生產環境標準的 Deployment宣言來示範工作負載 整合(例如 Secret Manager CSI),而非原始的Pod宣言。

步驟 1:建立 SecretProviderClass

apiVersion: secrets-store.csi.x-k8s.io/v1
kind: SecretProviderClass
metadata:
  name: app-secrets-provider
  namespace: default
spec:
  provider: gke  # 識別 GKE 託管提供者
  parameters:
    secrets: |
      - resourceName: "projects//secrets/db-password/versions/latest"
        fileName: "db-password.txt"

步驟 2:在 Deployment 中掛載機密

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: secure-app
  namespace: default
spec:
  replicas: 2
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: secure-app
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: secure-app
    spec:
      serviceAccountName: secure-ksa  # 必須綁定至具備 Secret Manager 「Secret Accessor」角色的 GSA
      containers:
      - name: app
        image:
        volumeMounts:
        - name: secrets-volume
          mountPath: "/var/secrets"
          readOnly: true
      volumes:
      - name: secrets-volume
        csi:
          driver: secrets-store.csi.k8s.io
          readOnly: true
          volumeAttributes:
            secretProviderClass: "app-secrets-provider"

RBAC 強化措施

黃金路徑會停用不安全的舊版 RBAC 綁定,這些綁定會授予 system:authenticatedsystem:unauthenticated群組廣泛的存取權限。

# 驗證是否已停用不安全的綁定
gcloud container clusters describe --region \
  --format="yaml(rbacBindingConfig)" \
  --quiet

RBAC 的最佳實務:

  • 優先使用命名空間範圍的角色,而非全叢集範圍的 ClusterRoles
  • 應綁定至特定群組或服務帳戶,切勿綁定至system:authenticated
  • 透過 MCP 稽核權限:check_k8s_auth(parent="...", verb="list", resourceType="pods", namespace="...")(或使用kubectl auth can-i --list --as=
  • 透過 MCP 檢視綁定:get_k8s_resource(parent="...", resourceType="clusterrolebinding")(或使用kubectl get clusterrolebindings,rolebindings --all-namespaces

有關企業級 RBAC 規劃,請參閱gke-multitenancy技能,以及 https://docs.cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/best-practices/rbac.md.txt

二進位授權

預設在黃金路徑中未啟用,但建議用於生產環境的映像 來源追蹤:

# 啟用二進位授權
gcloud container clusters update --region \
  --binauthz-evaluation-mode=PROJECT_SINGLETON_POLICY_ENFORCE \
  --quiet

網路政策

Dataplane V2(黃金路徑)提供內建的網路政策執行功能。針對每個命名空間套用 預設拒絕政策:

# MCP(首選)
apply_k8s_manifest(parent="...", yamlManifest="")

# kubectl 備用方案
kubectl apply -f ./assets/default-deny-netpol.yaml -n

GKE 沙箱 (gVisor)

若要在隔離的沙盒中執行不可信的工作負載:

# 在叢集上啟用(標準叢集)
gcloud container clusters update --region --enable-gke-sandbox --quiet

# 在 Pod 規格中使用
# 新增:runtimeClassName: gvisor

Pod 安全標準(黃金路徑)

Pod 安全標準定義了三種配置檔,用以限制 Pod 的操作範圍。 「受限配置檔是生產環境命名空間的黃金路徑預設值

配置檔 等級 使用情境
特權 無限制 系統命名空間 (kube-system),
: : : 基礎架構控制器 :
基準 限制程度最低 共享/dev 命名空間、舊版應用程式
: : : 正在遷移中 :
受限 黃金路徑 生產環境工作負載 -- 區塊
: : : 權限提升、主機存取、 :
: : : root :

透過命名空間標籤強制執行(Pod 安全性准入):

apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: production
  labels:
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted

漸進式部署策略:

  1. 首先對現有命名空間進行警告+稽核,以識別違規情況
  2. 修正不符合規範的工作負載(移除特權hostNetwork、root 使用者等)
  3. 待所有工作負載均通過檢查後,啟用強制執行

受限項目:以 root 身分執行、權限提升、主機 網路/PID/IPC、主機路徑儲存區,以及多數功能。黃金路徑 workload-identity-pod.yaml已符合規範。

網路政策記錄 (建議)

透過 Dataplane V2(黃金路徑),您可以啟用網路政策 決策的記錄功能。此設定並非黃金路徑的預設值,但建議用於安全稽核。

gcloud container clusters update --region \
  --enable-network-policy-logging \
  --quiet

此設定會記錄允許與拒絕的連線,有助於排除網路 政策規則的疑難排解,並稽核流量。

常見的 IAM 角色

GKE 最常見的五個預定義 IAM 角色:

角色 用途 何時使用
roles/container.admin 平台團隊管理員
: : 叢集及 : 管理叢集 :
: : Kubernetes : 生命週期 :
: : 資源 : :
角色/container.clusterAdmin 管理叢集,但 叢集操作員
: : 並非專案層級 : 負責建立/刪除 :
: : IAM : 叢集 :
roles/container.developer 部署工作負載 應用程式
: : (Pod、服務、 : 開發人員將 :
: : 部署) : 至現有叢集 :
roles/container.viewer 監控、
: : 叢集與 : 稽核,或 :
: : Kubernetes : 唯讀儀表板 :
: : 資源 : :
roles/container.clusterViewer 列出並取得 符合以下條件的 CI/CD 管道:
: : 叢集詳細資訊 : 需要叢集 :
: : 僅需 : 元資料 :

最小權限原則:請從roles/container.viewerroles/container.developer開始,並僅在必要時提升權限。避免廣泛授予 roles/container.admin 權限

服務帳戶與代理程式

  • GKE 服務代理 (service-@container-engine-robot.iam.gserviceaccount.com): 自動建立。代表您管理節點、網路及叢集運作。 請勿移除或修改其權限。
  • 節點服務帳戶:預設情況下,節點會使用 Compute Engine 的預設 服務帳戶。在生產環境中,請建立一個權限最低的專用服務帳戶, 並透過節點群組設定加以指派。
  • 工作負載身分識別:Pod 存取 Google Cloud API 的建議方式。將 Kubernetes ServiceAccount 映射至 Google IAM ServiceAccount — 請參閱 上方的「工作負載身分識別」設定。

跨服務驗證模式

授予 GKE 工作負載存取其他 Google Cloud 服務的常見模式:

# 授予 GKE 工作負載存取 Cloud Storage 的權限
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding \
  --member "serviceAccount:@.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/storage.objectViewer" \
  --quiet

# 授予 GKE 工作負載存取 Cloud SQL 的權限
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding \
  --member "serviceAccount:@.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/cloudsql.client" \
  --quiet

# 授予 GKE 工作負載存取 Pub/Sub 的權限
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding \
  --member "serviceAccount:@.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/pubsub.subscriber" \
  --quiet

在所有情況下,GSA 都必須透過「工作負載身分識別」(參見上文的設定) 與 KSA 建立綁定關係。隨後,Pod 會使用 KSA 來以 GSA 的身分進行驗證。

在 GitHub 上查看
---
name: gke-security
description: Hardens Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters with Workload Identity, Secret Manager, RBAC, Binary Authorization, Network Policies, and Pod Security Standards.
---

# GKE Security

This reference covers security configuration for GKE clusters. The golden path
enforces a hardened security posture by default.

> **MCP Tools:** `get_cluster`, `check_k8s_auth`, `get_k8s_resource`,
> `apply_k8s_manifest`, `update_cluster`

## Golden Path Security Defaults

Setting                                                        | Golden Path Value                       | Day-0/1 | Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------- | ------- | -----
`workloadIdentityConfig.workloadPool`                          | `<PROJECT>.svc.id.goog`                 | Day-0   | Workload Identity Federation for Pods
`secretManagerConfig.enabled`                                  | `true`                                  | Day-1   | Google Secret Manager integration
`secretManagerConfig.rotationConfig`                           | `enabled: true, rotationInterval: 120s` | Day-1   | Automatic secret rotation
`rbacBindingConfig.enableInsecureBindingSystemAuthenticated`   | `false`                                 | Day-0   | Blocks legacy `system:authenticated` bindings
`rbacBindingConfig.enableInsecureBindingSystemUnauthenticated` | `false`                                 | Day-0   | Blocks legacy `system:unauthenticated` bindings
`nodeConfig.shieldedInstanceConfig.enableSecureBoot`           | `true`                                  | Day-0   | Verifiable boot integrity
`nodeConfig.shieldedInstanceConfig.enableIntegrityMonitoring`  | `true`                                  | Day-0   | Runtime integrity checks
`nodeConfig.workloadMetadataConfig.mode`                       | `GKE_METADATA`                          | Day-0   | Blocks legacy metadata API, enforces Workload Identity
Private cluster + Dataplane V2 settings                        | See the `gke-networking` skill          | Day-0   | Private nodes, private endpoint enforcement, ADVANCED_DATAPATH

## Workload Identity Federation

Workload Identity is the recommended way for pods to access Google Cloud APIs.
It eliminates the need for static service account keys.

### Setup

```bash
# 1. Create a Google Service Account (GSA)
gcloud iam service-accounts create <GSA_NAME> \
  --project <PROJECT_ID> \
  --display-name "Workload Identity SA" \
  --quiet

# 2. Grant IAM roles to the GSA
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding <PROJECT_ID> \
  --member "serviceAccount:<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "<ROLE>" \
  --quiet

# 3. Create Kubernetes Service Account (KSA)
kubectl create namespace <NAMESPACE>
kubectl create serviceaccount <KSA_NAME> --namespace <NAMESPACE>

# 4. Bind KSA to GSA
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
  <GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
  --role roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser \
  --member "serviceAccount:<PROJECT_ID>.svc.id.goog[<NAMESPACE>/<KSA_NAME>]" \
  --quiet

# 5. Annotate KSA
kubectl annotate serviceaccount <KSA_NAME> \
  --namespace <NAMESPACE> \
  iam.gke.io/gcp-service-account=<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com
```

> See [assets/workload-identity-pod.yaml](./assets/workload-identity-pod.yaml)
> for a test pod.

### Verification

```bash
kubectl run workload-identity-test \
  --image=gcr.io/google.com/cloudsdktool/cloud-sdk:slim \
  --serviceaccount=<KSA_NAME> --namespace=<NAMESPACE> \
  --rm -it -- gcloud auth list --quiet
```

## Secret Manager Integration

The golden path enables Secret Manager with automatic rotation. Secrets are
synced to Kubernetes Secrets.

```bash
# Verify Secret Manager is enabled on cluster
gcloud container clusters describe <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --format="value(secretManagerConfig.enabled)" \
  --quiet

# Enable if not already (Day-1 change)
gcloud container clusters update <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --enable-secret-manager \
  --secret-manager-rotation-interval=120s \
  --quiet
```

### Mounting Secrets via CSI Volume (Deployment Example)

Once the Secret Manager add-on is enabled, workloads can mount secrets as
volumes using the Secrets Store CSI driver. This requires two steps:

1.  **Define a `SecretProviderClass`** to specify which secrets to retrieve from
    Secret Manager.
2.  **Mount the volume in a `Deployment`** referencing that class.

> [!IMPORTANT] **Production Best Practice**: Always demonstrate workload
> integrations (like Secret Manager CSI) using production-standard
> **`Deployment`** manifests rather than raw `Pod` manifests.

#### Step 1: Create the SecretProviderClass

```yaml
apiVersion: secrets-store.csi.x-k8s.io/v1
kind: SecretProviderClass
metadata:
  name: app-secrets-provider
  namespace: default
spec:
  provider: gke  # Identifies GKE managed provider
  parameters:
    secrets: |
      - resourceName: "projects/<PROJECT_ID>/secrets/db-password/versions/latest"
        fileName: "db-password.txt"
```

#### Step 2: Mount the secret in a Deployment

```yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: secure-app
  namespace: default
spec:
  replicas: 2
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: secure-app
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: secure-app
    spec:
      serviceAccountName: secure-ksa  # Must be bound to GSA with Secret Manager Secret Accessor role
      containers:
      - name: app
        image: <IMAGE>
        volumeMounts:
        - name: secrets-volume
          mountPath: "/var/secrets"
          readOnly: true
      volumes:
      - name: secrets-volume
        csi:
          driver: secrets-store.csi.k8s.io
          readOnly: true
          volumeAttributes:
            secretProviderClass: "app-secrets-provider"
```

## RBAC Hardening

The golden path disables insecure legacy RBAC bindings that grant broad access
to `system:authenticated` and `system:unauthenticated` groups.

```bash
# Verify insecure bindings are disabled
gcloud container clusters describe <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --format="yaml(rbacBindingConfig)" \
  --quiet
```

**Best practices for RBAC:**

-   Use namespace-scoped Roles over cluster-wide ClusterRoles
-   Bind to specific Groups or ServiceAccounts, never to `system:authenticated`
-   Audit permissions via MCP: `check_k8s_auth(parent="...", verb="list",
    resourceType="pods", namespace="...")` (or `kubectl auth can-i --list
    --as=<user>`)
-   Review bindings via MCP: `get_k8s_resource(parent="...",
    resourceType="clusterrolebinding")` (or `kubectl get
    clusterrolebindings,rolebindings --all-namespaces`)

> See the `gke-multitenancy` skill for enterprise RBAC planning and
> https://docs.cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/best-practices/rbac.md.txt

## Binary Authorization

Not enabled in golden path by default but recommended for production image
provenance:

```bash
# Enable Binary Authorization
gcloud container clusters update <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --binauthz-evaluation-mode=PROJECT_SINGLETON_POLICY_ENFORCE \
  --quiet
```

## Network Policies

Dataplane V2 (golden path) provides built-in Network Policy enforcement. Apply
default-deny per namespace:

```
# MCP (preferred)
apply_k8s_manifest(parent="...", yamlManifest="<contents of default-deny-netpol.yaml>")

# kubectl fallback
kubectl apply -f ./assets/default-deny-netpol.yaml -n <NAMESPACE>
```

## GKE Sandbox (gVisor)

For running untrusted workloads in an isolated sandbox:

```bash
# Enable on cluster (Standard clusters)
gcloud container clusters update <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> --enable-gke-sandbox --quiet

# Use in pod spec
# Add: runtimeClassName: gvisor
```

## Pod Security Standards (Golden Path)

Pod Security Standards define three profiles that restrict what pods can do. The
**`restricted` profile is the golden path default** for production namespaces.

| Profile      | Level                 | Use Case                           |
| ------------ | --------------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| `privileged` | Unrestricted          | System namespaces (`kube-system`), |
:              :                       : infrastructure controllers         :
| `baseline`   | Minimally restrictive | Shared/dev namespaces, legacy apps |
:              :                       : being migrated                     :
| `restricted` | **Golden path**       | Production workloads -- blocks     |
:              :                       : privilege escalation, host access, :
:              :                       : root                               :

**Enforce via namespace labels (Pod Security Admission):**

```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: production
  labels:
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
```

**Gradual rollout strategy:**

1.  Start with `warn` + `audit` on existing namespaces to identify violations
2.  Fix non-compliant workloads (remove `privileged`, `hostNetwork`, root user,
    etc.)
3.  Enable `enforce` once all workloads pass

`restricted` blocks: running as root, privilege escalation, host
networking/PID/IPC, host path volumes, and most capabilities. The golden path
`workload-identity-pod.yaml` already complies.

## Network Policy Logging (Recommended)

With Dataplane V2 (golden path), you can enable logging for Network Policy
decisions. **Not a golden path default** -- recommended for security auditing.

```bash
gcloud container clusters update <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --enable-network-policy-logging \
  --quiet
```

This logs allowed and denied connections, useful for troubleshooting Network
Policy rules and auditing traffic flows.

## Common IAM Roles

The five most common predefined IAM roles for GKE:

| Role                            | Purpose             | When to Use          |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------- |
| `roles/container.admin`         | Full control over   | Platform team admins |
:                                 : clusters and        : managing cluster     :
:                                 : Kubernetes          : lifecycle            :
:                                 : resources           :                      :
| `roles/container.clusterAdmin`  | Manage clusters but | Cluster operators    |
:                                 : not project-level   : who create/delete    :
:                                 : IAM                 : clusters             :
| `roles/container.developer`     | Deploy workloads    | Application          |
:                                 : (pods, services,    : developers deploying :
:                                 : deployments)        : to existing clusters :
| `roles/container.viewer`        | Read-only access to | Monitoring,          |
:                                 : clusters and        : auditing, or         :
:                                 : Kubernetes          : read-only dashboards :
:                                 : resources           :                      :
| `roles/container.clusterViewer` | List and get        | CI/CD pipelines that |
:                                 : cluster details     : need cluster         :
:                                 : only                : metadata             :

> **Principle of least privilege**: Start with `roles/container.viewer` or
> `roles/container.developer` and escalate only as needed. Avoid granting
> `roles/container.admin` broadly.

## Service Accounts & Agents

-   **GKE Service Agent**
    (`service-<PROJECT_NUMBER>@container-engine-robot.iam.gserviceaccount.com`):
    Automatically created. Manages nodes, networking, and cluster operations on
    your behalf. Do not remove or modify its permissions.
-   **Node Service Account**: By default, nodes use the Compute Engine default
    service account. For production, create a dedicated SA with minimal
    permissions and assign it via node pool config.
-   **Workload Identity**: The recommended way for pods to access Google Cloud
    APIs. Maps a Kubernetes ServiceAccount to a Google IAM ServiceAccount — see
    [Workload Identity setup](#workload-identity-federation) above.

## Cross-Service Authentication Patterns

Common patterns for granting GKE workloads access to other Google Cloud
services:

```bash
# Grant a GKE workload access to Cloud Storage
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding <PROJECT_ID> \
  --member "serviceAccount:<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/storage.objectViewer" \
  --quiet

# Grant a GKE workload access to Cloud SQL
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding <PROJECT_ID> \
  --member "serviceAccount:<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/cloudsql.client" \
  --quiet

# Grant a GKE workload access to Pub/Sub
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding <PROJECT_ID> \
  --member "serviceAccount:<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/pubsub.subscriber" \
  --quiet
```

In all cases, the GSA must be bound to a KSA via Workload Identity (see setup
above). The pod then uses the KSA to authenticate as the GSA.

所有檔案

0 個檔案

安裝 gke-security

請下載並將技能檔案解壓縮至您的 .claude/skills/ 目錄中。

下載 ZIP

複製儲存庫並將技能檔案複製到您的專案中。

git clone https://github.com/google/skills/tree/main/skills/cloud/gke-security # Copy SKILL.md to your .claude/skills/ directory

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快速設定: 將技能資料夾複製到 .claude/skills/ Claude 會自動偵測並使用該技能
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